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I. INTRODUCTION
On April 6, 2016, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit handed
down a decision that unwound decades of precedent. The decision had the
ability to lead to the United States denaturalizing and deporting more
immigrants in a way that would violate the domestic goals of the country for
immigration and naturalization, as well the United States’ obligations of nonrefoulement in the international community.1 In the court’s decision in
United States v. Maslenjak, the Sixth Circuit ruled testimonial or
documentary representations in the naturalization process need not be
material to trigger criminal liability under 18 U.S.C. § 1425(a).2 Luckily, the
Supreme Court reversed this decision in 2017, holding any misstatements
must be material for criminal liability to be present.3
Divna Maslenjak was born in a predominately-Serbian village in what is
now the nation of Bosnia.4 Muslims in the surrounding region often clashed
with ethnic Serbs in the area like the Maslenjaks.5 As the former Yugoslavia
began to break up, the United States sent immigration officials to assist
refugees that were fleeing the violent ethnic cleansing in Bosnia.6 In an
interview to determine refugee eligibility, Divna Maslenjak (the primary
applicant for her family’s asylum application) stated under oath that her
family feared persecution because her husband, who lived apart from her
from 1992 to 1997 to avoid being conscripted, did not serve in the military
during the war.7 The Maslenjaks were given refugee status in 1999,

1

United States v. Maslenjak, 821 F.3d 675 (6th Cir. 2016), rev’d, 137 S. Ct. 1918 (2017).
18 U.S.C.S. § 1425(a) (LexisNexis 2016) (stating that “(a) Whoever knowingly procures
or attempts to procure, contrary to law, the naturalization of any person, or documentary or
other evidence of naturalization or of citizenship; or (b) Whoever, whether for himself or
another person not entitled thereto, knowingly issues, procures or obtains or applies for or
otherwise attempts to procure or obtain naturalization, or citizenship, or a declaration of
intention to become a citizen, or a certificate of arrival or any certificate or evidence of
nationalization or citizenship, documentary or otherwise, or duplicates or copies of any of the
foregoing—Shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 25 years (if the offense
was committed to facilitate an act of international terrorism (as defined in section 2331 of this
title [18 USCS § 2331])), 20 years (if the offense was committed to facilitate a drug
trafficking crime (as defined in section 929(a) of this title [18 USCS § 929(a)])), 10 years (in
the case of the first or second such offense, if the offense was not committed to facilitate such
an act of international terrorism or a drug trafficking crime), or 15 years (in the case of any
other offense), or both.”).
3
See Maslenjak v. United States, 582 U.S. 137 S. Ct. 1918 (2017).
4
United States v. Maslenjak, 821 F.3d at 680.
5
Id.
6
Id.
7
Id.
2
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immigrated to the United States and settled in Ohio in 2000 where they were
granted permanent resident status in 2004.8
In 2006, the Department of Homeland Security investigated Divna’s
husband, Ratko, for failing to disclose military service in Serbia on his
immigration application.9 Ratko served in a brigade that committed war
crimes, although there is no evidence he was personally involved in the
crimes.10 Nevertheless, he was arrested in December 2006 for making a false
statement on a government document.11 A week after Ratko’s arrest, Divna
Maslenjak filed a N-400 Application for Naturalization that stated she had
never “knowingly given false or misleading information to any U.S.
government official while applying for any immigration benefit or to avoid
deportation, exclusion, or removal” or “lied to any U.S. government official
to gain entry or admission into the United States.”12 Divna Maslenjak was
naturalized on August 3, 2007.13
Ratko Maslenjak was convicted and thus subject to removal, so he filed a
petition for asylum.14 Divna filed an I-130 Petition for Alien Relative and
testified in her husband’s asylum hearing. During the hearing, she admitted
to lying to immigration officers about her husband’s military service.
Further, she admitted to lying when she told immigration officers the pair
had lived apart while in Bosnia.15 Divna Maslenjak was subsequently
indicted by a federal grand jury for “knowingly procuring her naturalization
contrary to law in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1425(a)” and “knowingly
misusing her unlawfully issued certificate of naturalization to file a Form I130 Petition for Alien Relative on February 6, 2009, to obtain lawful
permanent resident status for her husband, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1423.”16 A jury found her guilty on both charges and granted the
government’s motion to revoke her naturalized status under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1451(e).17
The case was appealed to the Sixth Circuit. The first issue before the
court was whether 18 U.S.C. § 1425(a) contained an implied requirement of
materiality when naturalized citizens face mandatory denaturalization after

8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17

Id.
Id.
Id. at 675.
Id.
Id. at 680.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 675.
Id.
Id.
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conviction.18 The Sixth Circuit held that proof of a material false statement
is not necessary to sustain a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1425(a).19 The
court reasoned there is no statutory support for the materiality requirement
because it is not in the text of the statute.20 The court dismissed the position
of previous courts, particularly the Ninth Circuit, which had read in a
materiality requirement. The Sixth Circuit said that reading in a materiality
requirement would be “inconsistent with other laws criminalizing false
statements in immigration proceedings and regulating the naturalization
process.”21 The court also reasoned that the Immigration and Nationality Act
(INA) created a two track system that has both civil and criminal
denaturalization, and the lack of a materiality requirement would be justified
by the fact a higher burden (beyond reasonable doubt) must be met to trigger
mandatory denaturalization in the criminal context.22 As a result of the
court’s ruling, Divna Maslenjak filed a writ of certiorari in September 2016
to have her case heard by the Supreme Court.23 The Maslenjaks were
deported to Serbia at the end of September 2016.24 Despite their deportation,
the Maslenjak’s case was argued before the Supreme Court on April 26,
2017.25 The Supreme Court issued a slip opinion on June 22, 2017 in which
the Court vacated the Sixth Circuit’s decision and remanded the case to be
decided in a manner consistent with the Supreme Court’s approach.26
According to the text of the statute, any conviction under 18 U.S.C.
§ 1425(a) triggers the mandatory criminal denaturalization under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1451(e).27 In making its ruling to not read in a requirement of materiality,
the Sixth Circuit broke with every other circuit that had previously

18

Id. at 682.
Id. at 683.
20
Id. at 682.
21
Id. at 683.
22
Id. at 683–84.
23
Id.; see Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Maslenjak, 137 S. Ct. 1918 (2017) (No. 16-309).
24
Press Release, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Bosnian Husband, Wife
Repatriated After More Than Decade-long Immigration Fraud Probe (Oct. 3, 2016), https://
www.ice.gov/news/releases/bosnian-husband-wife-repatriated-after-more-decade-long-immig
ration-fraud-probe.
25
See Maslenjak v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1918 (2017).
26
Id.
27
8 U.S.C.S. § 1451(e) (LexisNexis 2016) (stating that “[w]hen a person shall be convicted
under section 1425 of title 18 of the United States Code of knowingly procuring naturalization
in violation of law, the court in which such conviction is had shall thereupon revoke, set aside,
and declare void the final order admitting such person to citizenship, and shall declare the
certificate of naturalization of such person to be canceled. Jurisdiction is hereby conferred on
the courts having jurisdiction of the trial of such offense to make such adjudication.”).
19
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considered the issue.28 The result would have been anyone convicted under
18 U.S.C. § 1425(a) would be subject to mandatory criminal denaturalization
under 8 U.S.C. § 1451(e) regardless of whether the misstatements made to
procure naturalization were material. The Supreme Court overturned the
Sixth Circuit decision, although two opinions merely concurring in the
judgment could suggest a different result could be possible under different
factual circumstances if the Supreme Court is ever asked to reconsider this
statutory scheme.29
Generally, there are two types of statutory construction courts can use to
interpret statutes when there is more than one plausible reading. The two
categories are the textual/language canons of construction and the
substantive canons of construction.30 The outcome of the inquiry into the
canons of statutory construction will determine what possible solutions there
are to the issues outlined above when mandatory criminal denaturalization is
the result of a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1425(a) regardless of materiality.
Although the Sixth Circuit thought it had a more accurate reading of the
statutory scheme between 18 U.S.C. § 1425 and 8 U.S.C. § 1451 under the
textual canons of construction, Justice Kagan argued in her majority opinion
that the “procure, contrary to law” language meant that any misstatement had
to necessarily be material.31 In addition, the Ninth Circuit and Supreme
Court’s readings are supported even more by the substantive canons of
construction.32
The Supreme Court resolved the circuit-split to the advantage of several
policy-based considerations.
First, by following the Sixth Circuit’s
interpretation, the United States would have risked violating its own
longstanding domestic policies of immigration, robbing itself of productive
members of society. The United States has long sought to promote robust
immigration that would lead to productive immigrants becoming part of the
nation’s citizenry. George Washington, for example, sought to attract
immigrants to the United States that would be “sober, industrious, and

28
See United States v. Puerta, 982 F.2d 1297 (9th Cir. 1992); see, e.g., United States v.
Aladekoba, 61 Fed. App’x 27 (4th Cir. 2003); United States v. Alferahin, 433 F.3d 1148 (9th
Cir. 2006).
29
Maslenjak v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1918 (2017); see also James F. Spriggs II &
Thomas G. Hansford, Explaining the Overruling of U.S. Supreme Court Precedent, 63 J. POL.
1091, 1105 (2001).
30
Larry Eig, Statutory Interpretation: General Principles and Recent Trends (Congressional
Research Service, Dec. 9, 2011), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/97-589.pdf.
31
Maslenjak v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1918 (2017); see generally Eig, supra note 30.
32
Eig, supra note 30.
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virtuous members of Society.”33 James Madison advocated for immigrants
so long as they would be “a real addition to the wealth or strength of the
United States” and were willing to assimilate and incorporate themselves
into the American society.34 Today, the goals of the United States in the
immigration system are to
reunite families . . . admit workers with specific skills and to
fill positions in occupations deemed to be experiencing labor
shortages . . . provide a refuge for people who face the risk of
political racial, or religious persecution . . . [and] ensure
diversity by providing admission to people from countries with
historically low rates of immigration to the United States.35
The mandatory criminal denaturalization process would be too rigid in many
instances if materiality is not required and could lead to the deportation of
formerly-naturalized citizens that have been nothing but “sober, industrious,
and virtuous” members of the United States since immigrating to the
country.36
Further, if the United States were to deport denaturalized citizens, it could
violate the 1967 Protocol to the Refugee Convention to which it is a party.
The 1967 Protocol to the Refugee Convention incorporates the first thirtyfour articles of the original Refugee Convention in 1951.37 Articles 32 and
33 of the Refugee Convention, which the United States is bound to follow as
a party to the 1967 Protocol, may present particular trouble within the global
community if the United States mandatorily denaturalized and then deported
immigrants that did not give material false statements but were still
convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1425(a).38 In addition, the United Nations High
33
Letter from President George Washington to Rev. Francis Adrian Vanderkemp (May 28,
1788), http://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/document/letter-to-reverend-francis-adrian-van
derkemp/.
34
James Madison, Naturalization, [3 February] 1790, Founders Online, National Archives,
http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/01-13-02-0018 (last modified Feb. 1, 2018).
35
Immigration Policy in the United States, CONG. BUDGET OFF. (2006), https://www.cbo.
gov/sites/default/files/109th-congress-2005-2006/reports/02-28-immigration.pdf.
36
Letter from President George Washington to Rev. Francis Adrian Vanderkemp, supra
note 33.
37
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223 [hereinafter
1967 Protocol].
38
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 32, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150
[hereinafter 1951 Convention] (stating that refugees can only be expelled for compelling
reasons of national security, the expulsion process must afford refugees due process of law,
and expelled refugees have to be given a “reasonable period” to seek entry into another
country); id. art. 33 (stating that refugees cannot be expelled back into a country where they
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Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) currently maintains that the principle
of non-refoulement is customary international law due to widespread state
practice.39 Therefore, if naturalized citizens were to be mandatorily
denaturalized and yet still maintained refugee status, the United States would
have either subjected those people to life as second-class or shadow-class
citizens in the United States or risked violating its international obligations
by deporting former citizens that are denaturalized.
This Note will first discuss the Maslenjak case as well as United States v.
Puerta40 and their disparate impacts on the United States’ immigration
scheme. This will require a look into the denaturalization process as a
whole, including a comparison of the civil and criminal denaturalization
processes. Comparing the two is necessary because of the different burdens
of proof in criminal and civil cases. Further, criminal denaturalization in this
context is mandatory, while civil denaturalization is at the discretion of the
court.
In part, this Note will also discuss and evaluate the canons of statutory
construction in order to demonstrate how they support either the Sixth or
Ninth Circuit readings. In part, this Note will explain why the mandatory
criminal denaturalization process, as interpreted by the Sixth Circuit, would
have raised complications for the United States both domestically and
internationally. The Sixth Circuit ruling ran afoul of the longstanding
domestic policies in favor of bringing immigrants into the country and giving
them the chance to become naturalized citizens in the first place. The United
States would also have risked a choice between subjecting formerlynaturalized citizens to second-rate citizenship or violating obligations under
the 1967 Protocol by deporting them. Finally, in part, this Note will examine
the Supreme Court’s decision and comment on why there could still be cause
for concern despite the fact that the Court overturned the Sixth Circuit.
Ultimately, the only way to resolve this issue conclusively may be a change
to the text of the statutory scheme by Congress.

would be threatened on grounds of “race, religion, nationality, [or] membership of a particular
social group or political opinion”).
39
UNHCR Note on the Principal of Non-Refoulement, UNHCR (Nov. 1997), http://www.
refworld.org/docid/438c6d972.html.
40
United States v. Puerta, 982 F.2d 1297 (9th Cir. 1992).
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II. THE LAW OF DENATURALIZATION AND DEPORTATION
A. United States v. Puerta
The Sixth Circuit in Maslenjak acknowledged its reasoning differed from
Puerta and its progeny.41 The Puerta court cited the materiality requirement
in 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a), as well as the fact that both parties had previously
agreed on a materiality requirement, as the reasons for finding that a false
statement had to be material in order to convict under 18 U.S.C. § 1425(a).42
The Puerta court also argued that the Supreme Court’s ruling in Kungys v.
United States supported the conclusion that there was an implied materiality
requirement in 18 U.S.C. § 1425(a), citing the “ ‘gravity of the
consequences.’ ”43 The court in Maslenjak criticized these justifications,
noting that “material” does not appear in either § 1425(a) or § 1451(e) and
other statutes pertaining to false statements made in immigration proceedings
do not require materiality.44 Further, the Sixth Circuit pointed out that while
the parties in Puerta agreed that there was a materiality requirement, the
parties did not agree in Maslenjak.45 According to the Sixth Circuit, the final
reason why the court in Puerta was wrong was the heightened burden of
proof in criminal denaturalization (compared to the civil proceeding) negated
the concerns of the Puerta court about the “gravity of consequences.”46
B. Proliferation of a Circuit Split After the Sixth Circuit Decision
Since the Maslenjak decision was handed down by the Sixth Circuit in
April 2016, several courts have reacted to the court’s holding that immaterial
false statements are enough to evidence a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1425(a)
and trigger mandatory criminal denaturalization under 8 U.S.C. § 1451(e). A
few examples that preceded the Supreme Court’s decision to overturn the
Sixth Circuit are presented here. The Sixth Circuit handled a similar case in
which the court emphatically reaffirmed its opinion of the materiality
requirement from Maslenjak.47 The Southern District of Florida expressly
41

Maslenjak v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1918 (2017).
Puerta, 982 F.2d at 1297.
43
Id. at 1301 (quoting Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759 (1988)).
44
Maslenjak, 821 F.3d at 675.
45
Id.
46
Id. at 692.
47
United States v. Al-Kadumi, 661 Fed. App’x 340 (6th Cir. 2016). The court in this case
held that an Iraqi man who knowingly assumed the identity of someone else in order to obtain
refugee status through the UNHCR and the United States had violated § 1425(a) and was subject
to mandatory denaturalization, regardless of the materiality of his misrepresentation. Id.
42
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found that 18 U.S.C. § 1425(a) does not include an implied element of
materiality.48 Two more courts, while not directly addressing the issue of
whether materiality is an implied element of 18 U.S.C. § 1425(a),
commented at least somewhat favorably in dicta on the Maslenjak court’s
holding that the elements of criminal and civil denaturalization are
different.49 A district court in Iowa expressly rejected the Maslenjak court’s
approach, finding that there is a materiality requirement for both § 1425(a)
and § 1425(b).50 Of course, the Supreme Court also read-in a materiality
requirement, foreclosing the issue for the immediate future.51
C. The Supreme Court’s Decision
At first glance, it would seem the Supreme Court’s 9–0 decision would
foreclose many of the issues expected to result from the Sixth Circuit’s
reading of the statutory scheme.52 Justice Kagan, writing for the majority,
held the word “procure” meant that false statements had to be material to the
naturalization process, as otherwise they would not have been used to
“procure” naturalization.53 However, the Court did not stop there. Justice
Kagan also established a few standards to be used by the lower courts going
forward to determine whether mistakes are material.54 Kagan says the lie by
a defendant “must have played a role in her naturalization” or the true facts
behind the lie must be of a nature that, when investigated, would lead “to the

48

United States v. Santos, No. 1:15-cr-20865-LENARD, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97500
(S.D. Fla. July 26, 2016). The court issued an order for the sole purpose of establishing that
§ 1425(a) contained no materiality requirement, relying extensively on the Maslenjak
decision. Id.
49
United States v. Nguyen, 829 F.3d 907 (8th Cir. 2016) (mentioning the Maslenjak court’s
holding that the materiality requirements were different for criminal and civil denaturalization,
but determined that they did not have to reach that question to rule that most of the
defendant’s convictions should be upheld); United States v. Haultain, No. 5:15-CV-6141-FJG,
2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 122792 (W.D. Mo. Sept. 12, 2016) (endorsing the differences in the
criminal and civil denaturalization processes in order to make the point that even if the
government declined to pursue criminal denaturalization in connection with a criminal
conviction, the government could still later pursue civil denaturalization for related events).
50
United States v. Ngombwa, No. 14-CR-123-LRR, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118926 (N.D.
Iowa Jan. 10, 2016). The court in this case rejects the government’s contention that § 1425(b)
has no materiality requirement, and further goes on to assert that § 1425(a) has no materiality
requirement either, finding the Kungys ruling applicable and in conflict with the Maslenjak
court’s ruling. Id.
51
Maslenjak v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1918, 1931 (2017).
52
Id.
53
Id. at 1920.
54
Id. at 1929.
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discovery of other facts which would” change the naturalization decision.55
If the government relies on the investigation theory going forward, it must
prove that the “misrepresented fact was sufficiently relevant to one or
another naturalization criterion that it would have prompted reasonable
officials . . . to undertake further investigation.”56 Plus, the government
would have to establish the investigation “would predictably have disclosed
some legal disqualification.”57 Taking Kagan’s opinion on its own, it seems
airtight and appears to avoid many of the potential issues that could have
been caused by the Sixth Circuit’s ruling.
However, both Justice Gorsuch and Justice Alito wrote opinions
concurring in the judgment that cast doubt on how the extent the
denaturalization and deportation issues described in this Note will be
avoided. Justice Gorsuch’s opinion, which Justice Thomas joined, concurred
with the result of the majority.58 Gorsuch also attacked the standards
established by the Kagan opinion, saying they were an overreach; Gorsuch
wanted the court to simply rule that causation was required, but allow the
district courts and courts of appeal to sort out the exact standards to apply.59
Alito, concurring only in the judgment, took it a step further. He still wanted
to prevent denaturalization based on purely immaterial false statements, but
maintained that no causation was necessary to denaturalize a citizen as long
as the statement was material.60 Thus, under Alito’s opinion concurring in
the judgment, “if a defendant knowingly performs a substantial act that he or
she thinks will procure naturalization, that is sufficient for conviction.”61
This falls far short of the standard of proof required by Justice Kagan.
The opinions concurring in the judgment could re-open this split and
cause many of the same problems as the Sixth Circuit opinion might have
caused. For one, lower courts could seize on the Gorsuch opinion and
determine that Kagan’s standards established in Part B of her opinion are
mere dicta.62 If that happens, the case could come back up to the Supreme
Court, and on facts less egregious than the Maslenjak facts, the Court might

55

Id.
Id. at 1918.
57
Id.
58
Id. at 1931 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
59
Id. at 1932.
60
Id. (Alito, J., concurring).
61
Id. at 1932–33.
62
See Pierre N. Leval, Madison Lecture: Judging Under the Constitution, 81 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1249 (2006) (explaining how courts often find holdings to be dicta and vice versa).
56
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come out differently.63 Such a result would have the potential to subject
many naturalized citizens to the ill results discussed in this Note. The Alito
opinion concurring in the judgment is even more problematic, and in a
similar way. The Alito opinion could encourage courts to challenge Kagan’s
standard as mere dicta, which would likely result in an appeals process that
would land a similar case right back in the Supreme Court. If this dispute
were to come up in a few more years with a more conservative Supreme
Court, it seems possible the court could seize on one of these opinions
concurring in the judgment and re-open the problems caused by the Sixth
Circuit opinion detailed throughout this Note.
D. The History and Procedure of Denaturalization
It is necessary to delve into the differences of the civil and criminal
denaturalization process in order to demonstrate that quick, ministerial
criminal denaturalization is unfair for defendants accused of making
immaterial false statements to procure naturalization. The process is unfair,
since it does not allow judges to examine the particulars of each case. While
the civil denaturalization process is procedurally complex, the criminal
denaturalization process is straightforward. The Sixth Circuit in Maslenjak
noted that the criminal denaturalization process is mandatory and endorsed
the view of other circuits that the process is purely ministerial.64 The burden
of proof that the government must meet, as in all criminal proceedings, is
beyond reasonable doubt.65
On the other hand, the civil denaturalization process is far more
complex.66 Congress originally gave the Attorney General (now the
63
James F. Spriggs II & Thomas G. Hansford, Explaining the Overruling of U.S. Supreme
Court Precedent, 63 J. POL. 1091 (2001) (showing that cases with multiple opinions are about
22% more likely to be overturned per concurring opinion).
64
Id.; see United States v. Inocencio, 328 F.3d 1207, 1209 (9th Cir. 2003) (stating that the
criminal denaturalization process is purely ministerial and thus, district courts have no
oversight or discretion as to whether to denaturalize someone under 1451(e) who has been
convicted under 1425(a)).
65
Ryan Petersen, Comment, Be Our Guest, But Please Don’t Stay: A Comparison of U.S.
and German Immigration Policies and Guest Worker Programs, 14 TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L
L. 87, 109 (2006).
66
8 U.S.C. § 1451(a) (1994) (describing the civil denaturalization process as follows:
“Concealment of material evidence; refusal to testify. It shall be the duty of the United States
attorneys for the respective districts, upon affidavit showing good cause therefor, to institute
proceedings in any district court of the United States in the judicial district in which the
naturalized citizen may reside at the time of bringing suit, for the purpose of revoking and
setting aside the order admitting such person to citizenship and canceling the certificate of
naturalization on the ground that such order and certificate of naturalization were illegally
procured or were procured by concealment of a material fact or by willful misrepresentation,
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Department of Homeland Security) the full ability to naturalize, and the
courts were given the full ability to denaturalize.67 The naturalization
process did not provide an apparatus for revoking improperly procured
naturalization until 1906, and the provisions of cancelling naturalization
were reasserted in the Nationality Act of 1940.68 The Immigration and
Nationality Act changed the ability to reverse illegally procured
naturalizations, but Congress restored the ability in 1961.69 Ultimately, the
policy behind the creation of denaturalization proceedings was to rectify
improper judicial naturalizations.70 The denaturalization process only
applies to grants of citizenship procured through the naturalization process; it
does not apply to administrative certificates recognizing citizenship status.71
A civil denaturalization suit occurs in equity and must adhere to the rigid
statutory scheme.72 The civil denaturalization process adheres to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure where procedure is not specified in the statutes.73
However, the Supreme Court has said that despite the civil denaturalization
process being considered a suit in equity and district courts having some
limited discretion, equitable principles cannot be applied in order to excuse
illegal or fraudulent behavior.74
With respect to the civil denaturalization process, misstatements surely
must be material to trigger denaturalization. However, the standard for what
may be material has not been definitely answered.75 In fact, in the United
States v. Kungys case, the eight justices who heard the case issued five
different opinions, which produced greater uncertainty as to the dividing line
between what is and is not material in denaturalization proceedings.76
The first inquiry and investigation into the potential denaturalization of a
naturalized citizen is brought forth by the District Directors of the U.S.
Citizenship and Immigration Services.77 The matter then proceeds to a
Regional Director, with a recommendation whether to institute

and such revocation and setting aside of the order admitting such person to citizenship and
such canceling of certificate of naturalization shall be effective as of the original date of the
order and certificate, respectively. . . .”).
67
7-96 IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 96.08 (Matthew Bender ed., 2016).
68
Id.
69
Id.
70
Id.
71
Id.
72
Id. § 96.10.
73
Id.
74
Id.
75
Id. § 96.08.
76
Id.
77
Id.
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denaturalization proceedings.78 In most instances, the Office of Immigration
Litigation of the Civil Division, Department of Justice supervises the
denaturalization proceedings.79
When a naturalized citizen is denaturalized, the immediate effect of
denaturalization is to revoke their status as a United States citizen, restore
their former alien status, and make them subject to all consequences of alien
status.80 They may not be subjected to deportation or removal unless they
are deportable for illegal entry or other immigration violations.81 Some
courts have applied a sort of relation-back principle to denaturalization,
meaning that all benefits gained while a citizen would be revoked; in this
sense, denaturalized citizens would not be able to benefit from their illegal
actions.82 However, in practice, denaturalized citizens are often not subject
to deportation for actions that occurred during the time they were naturalized
citizens. Additionally, those who became naturalized by the preferred status
of relatives that became citizens through deceptive practices are also not
subject to deportation unless they participated in the deception that granted
them preferred status.83 However, denaturalized citizens are certainly subject
to deportation for past criminal offenses, such as former Nazis that gained
naturalization in the United States and were subsequently deported.84 There
is a split in the lower courts as to whether a denaturalized citizen’s spouse
and children can still benefit from derivative rights of the person’s
citizenship after it is revoked.85
Once a former citizen has lost their citizenship through denaturalization,
they become subject to deportation and removal laws and can more easily be
deported.86 Noncitizens in the United States are still afforded due process of
the law under the Fifth Amendment.87 However, deportation is considered a
civil, administrative proceeding, which means certain constitutional rights
reserved for criminal proceedings will not apply.88 An important point to
note is that deported former citizens can be left stateless or may have to be

78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88

Id.
Id.
Id. § 96.13.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
6-71 id. § 71.03.
6-72 id. § 72.04.
Peter Schuck, The Transformation of Immigration Law, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 25 (1984).
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expelled to a third country if they cannot return to their home country due to
political or economic circumstances.89
E. Application of the Law to the Maslenjak Case
The Maslenjak case is admittedly a poor factual example for the issues
the United States could have faced if the Sixth Circuit’s reading of the
relationship between 18 U.S.C. § 1425(a) and 8 U.S.C. § 1451(e) had
prevailed. This is because a jury, properly instructed, might find that Divna
Maslenjak’s false statements were material in securing naturalization
contrary to law.90 Divna and Ratko Maslenjak lied about the primary reason
their family was seeking asylum when Divna said that they feared
persecution due to her husband dodging the conscription efforts of the
Bosnian Serb army.91 Without a legitimate reason to fear persecution, the
Maslenjaks would not have met the definition of refugee under the 1951
Convention or 1967 Protocol updates.92 If the Maslenjaks had no reason to
fear persecution and thus did not meet refugee status, it seems unlikely that
the United States immigration services officials that met with them would
have allowed them to immigrate to the United States. As previously stated,
both Divna and Ratko Maslenjak have already been deported to Serbia.93
Further, even if the Maslenjaks did originally have refugee status, it is
unclear whether they still would have maintained refugee status after Divna
Maslenjak was naturalized and then later denaturalized. By the time that
Divna Maslenjak was denaturalized in 2016, the Bosnian Civil War was long
over.94 Although the Maslenjak case is not an exemplar case of the risks of
mandatory criminal denaturalization for material false statements used to
procure naturalization, similar cases where the false statements are
immaterial to naturalization and yet still trigger mandatory criminal
denaturalization run the risk of violating both domestic immigration policies
and international obligations of the United States. Some examples of cases
where the United States could violate domestic or international interests are
discussed later in this Note.
89

Id. at 26.
See Maslenjak v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1918, 1931 (2017).
91
United States v. Maslenjak, 821 F.3d 675, 680 (6th Cir. 2016).
92
See 1951 Convention art. 1, supra note 38; 1967 Protocol, supra note 37.
93
Eric Heisig, Suspected Bosnian War Criminal Awarded by Ohio Treasurer Josh Mandel
in 2014 Deported to Serbia, CLEVELAND.COM (Oct. 4, 2016), http://www.cleveland.com/courtjustice/index.ssf/2016/10/suspected_bosnian_war_criminal_1.html.
94
The Bosnian Conflict lasted from 1992–1995; a cease-fire was negotiated along with the
help of other countries in Dayton, Ohio in 1995. John Lampe, Bosnian Conflict, ENCYCLOPEDIA
BRITANNICA (May 9, 2016), https://www.britannica.com/event/Bosnian-conflict.
90
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F. The Statutory Canons of Construction
The split between the circuits seemed to draw a contrast between some of
the statutory canons of construction. Typically, the canons are vital to
statutory interpretation by the courts. For example, the Ninth Circuit read in
a materiality requirement where the Sixth Circuit refused to, as previously
discussed. There are a broad range of canons, and either reading could be
justified depending on the canon that judges choose to lean on in their
interpretation of the statutory scheme. Further, the way judges frame the
canons themselves could have a bearing on which canons they use to justify
their reading of the text of a statute. The canons of construction are
interpretive tools that have been developed by judges to help clarify statutory
uncertainty.95 Canons fall into two categories: language or linguistic and
substantive.96 The language canons primarily help judges reach an
interpretation through conventions like syntax, grammar, and word usage.97
In contrast, the substantive canons reach broad judicial concerns and often
help justices interpret beyond the four corners of the statutory text.98 At
times, canons may overlap and even conflict with each other.
The list of canons discussed here is not an exhaustive list of language
canons of construction, but merely a list of a few of the vital ones. First and
foremost is the plain meaning rule.99 This canon of construction is exactly
what it sounds like: the statement should be construed as it is written.100
There is also the ordinary meaning rule, which again is exactly what it
sounds like: if a word or phrase is not a term of art, then it should be read as
part of the statute in the way that particular word or phrase is ordinarily
understood.101
Somewhat related to the ordinary meaning rule is the rule for interpreting
“may” and “shall.”102 May should be interpreted as permissive, while shall
should be read as a mandatory requirement.103 However, it is important to
note that these two words have to be read within the ultimate statutory
95

Eig, supra note 30.
Id. The canons have been used in Anglo-American law since at least 1584, and one
recent study has found that the usage of canons is actually increasing, with the Supreme Court
relying on the canons in over 40% of their majority opinions. Jacob Scott, Codified Canons
and the Common Law of Interpretation, 98 GEO. L.J. 341, 344 (2010).
97
Eig, supra note 30.
98
Id. at 2.
99
Id. at 3.
100
Id.
101
Id.
102
Id.
103
Id.
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scheme, and it should be taken into account whether the statute seems to
compel mandatory or permissive behavior.104 In the instant case, the statutes
contain strong “shall” language, which could be read to demonstrate criminal
denaturalization is mandatory, not permissive.105
The final language canon of construction discussed here examines how a
court will handle a similar word or phrase appearing multiple times in a
statute. If a word or phrase is used several times in the same statute, then
that word or phrase will generally be given the same meaning each time.106
Similarly, if a word appears in one part of a statute but not another, it will
generally be read as though Congress intentionally left the word out where it
is not present. Thus, the word will not be read into the statute.107
The substantive canons, on the other hand, tend to be overarching
principles beyond the text of the statute that are used to justify a particular
substantive result.108 For example, the Supreme Court assumes Congress
enacts statutes with the common law in mind, and further assumes Congress
is wary of overturning common law for the benefit of a statute unless there is
a clear statutory indication that the two are incompatible.109 The Court also
tends to avoid finding a statute unconstitutional if at all possible.110 This
tends to hold true even if there is a plausible reading of the statute that would
make it unconstitutional.111 However, the Court will not read the statute in
the unconstitutional manner, unless the clear intent of Congress is for the
statute to be read in that manner.112
The rule of lenity is one of the most important substantive canons of
statutory construction. In regards to criminal statutes, the rule of lenity
dictates any ambiguities should be resolved in favor of the person being
charged under the statute.113 The justification behind this principle is that
Congress (and state legislatures), rather than the courts, should speak clearly
and unambiguously when it comes to criminal laws.114
The Charming Betsy presumption is a substantive canon of statutory
construction that has particular applicability to international law. The
standard, first espoused by Chief Justice John Marshall in 1804, requires that
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114

Id.
8 U.S.C.S. § 1451(e) (LexisNexis 2016); 18 U.S.C.S. § 1425(a) (LexisNexis 2016).
Eig, supra note 30, at 18.
Id. at 19.
Id. at 22.
Id. at 23.
Id. at 27.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 34.
Id.
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statutes enacted by Congress be read, whenever possible, so as not to conflict
with international law.115 Recently the Charming Betsy presumption has
received some pushback from the Chevron doctrine, which states the
Supreme Court should side with administrative agencies that have given a
reasonable construction to an unambiguous statute because some agency
readings conflict with the principles and obligations of international law.116
However, it seems that the Charming Betsy presumption remains in force, at
least for now.117 All of the canons discussed above could have bearing on
the interpretation of the statutory scheme between 8 U.S.C. § 1451 and 18
U.S.C. § 1425.
G. Theories of Statutory Interpretation
Although theories of statutory interpretation may be grouped in a variety
of ways, one scholar posits a scheme where there are three theories of
statutory interpretation which seem to guide decision-makers (justices,
agencies, or even just citizens) on which canons to rely on most heavily.118
Over time, it seems likely that individual decision-makers will use a mixture
of language and substantive canons depending on the case in front of them.
The three theories are the intentionalist theory, the new textualist theory, and
the pragmatic theory.119
Intentionalism, or the intentionalist theory, emphasizes applying the
canons of statutory construction to reveal the intent of the legislature above
all else.120 Intentionalism holds that statutes are the product of representative
democracy, so the will of the people is represented by the legislature, which
constitutes intent.121 Proponents of intentionalism recognize the inherent
flaws and inconsistencies of searching for subjective intent within statutes, so
they look to the text, structure, history, and purpose surrounding a statute in
an attempt to glean the objective intent of the legislature.122 Therefore,
115
Alex O. Canizares, Is Charming Betsy Losing Her Charm? Interpreting U.S. Statutes
Consistently with International Trade Agreements and the Chevron Doctrine, 20 EMORY INT’L
L. REV. 591 (2006); see Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64 (1804) (applying the
Charming Betsy presumption for the first time).
116
Canizares, supra note 115. The Chevron Doctrine or “Chevron deference” was defined
by the Supreme Court in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
467 U.S. 837, 865–66 (1984).
117
Canizares, supra note 115, at 648.
118
Jacob Scott, Codified Canons and the Common Law of Interpretation, 98 GEO. L.J. 341,
347–48 (2010).
119
Id. at 347.
120
Id. at 348.
121
Id.
122
Id.
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intentionalists typically attempt to show some manifest evidence of objective
intent rather than attempting to discover what the legislature intended in
enacting a given statute.123
New textualists endorse the idea of illuminating the objective intent of
legislatures, but they advocate a narrower version of intentionalism.124 New
textualists find the theories of interpretation of intentionalists too
indeterminate and as a result view the statutory language itself as the best
evidence of legislative intent.125 Thus, new textualists disregard legislative
history as a means of interpretation of legislative intent.126 New textualism,
though, is less strict than traditional textualism because it disregards strict
textual readings that would produce absurd results.127 The new textualists
still rely on the statutory language, but they do so by looking at the statute in
context.128
The pragmatic theory is more flexible in the interpretive devices that it
relies upon because pragmatists tend to use multiple supporting arguments
rather than one central theme.129 Thus, a true pragmatist uses a multitude of
canons of construction and weighs several competing interpretations and
arguments against one another.130 The pragmatic theory is said to proceed
from concrete to the abstract in seeking to interpret specific statutes.131
Pragmatism strives to consider a variety of approaches to statutory
interpretation, but critics of the pragmatic theory are concerned that justices
have too much leeway and their interpretive methodology is too
undisciplined.132
The circuit split on the reading of the statutory scheme at issue in
Maslenjak also presents an opportunity to examine how the Supreme Court
employs the canons of construction to elucidate the operation of statutory
scheme created by Congress. As previously stated, the canons of statutory
construction can be grouped in two ways: language and linguistic canons and
substantive canons.133 At the circuit level, it seemed the language canons
favored the Sixth Circuit reading, while the substantive canons favored the
Ninth Circuit reading. The plain meaning rule dictates the word “material”
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133

Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 348–49.
Id. at 349.
Id. This movement from concrete to abstract is known as the “funnel of abstraction.” Id.
Id.
Eig, supra note 30.
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should not be read into § 1451(e) or § 1425(a).134 Section 1451(e) requires
denaturalization upon “knowingly procuring naturalization in violation of
law.135 Section 1425(a) provides for violations only when someone
“knowingly procures or attempts to procure, contrary to law . . . .”136
Arguably, the plain meaning rule is inapplicable and the statute is
ambiguous, since neither § 1451(e) nor § 1425(a) contain a materiality
standard. The Supreme Court maintained the word “procured” implied a
material false statement was required, as citizenship could not be “procured”
without the false statement having some impact.137 Therefore, the plain
meaning rule was implicitly used by the Supreme Court justices to justify
their decision, though it could have arguably supported the Sixth Circuit’s
reading.
The similar words or phrases canon, as well as the logical converse of it,
seems to also favor the Sixth Circuit’s ruling.138 In this instance, a
materiality requirement is clearly stated in § 1451(a), but not § 1451(e) or
§ 1425(a). While it can be argued that this was a mistake by the legislature,
there is no evidence supporting this argument. Since there is no evidence of
a mistake by the legislature, the most obvious assumption based on the text is
that Congress intended to leave out the materiality requirement in § 1451(e)
and § 1425(a).139 In fact, this was a major component of the Sixth Circuit’s
opinion in the Maslenjak case.140 Though it would seem the strong weight of
the language canons of construction seems supportive the Sixth Circuit’s
reading of the statutory scheme, the Supreme Court justices apparently found
otherwise.
In addition, the substantive canons clearly weighed more heavily in favor
of the Ninth Circuit’s reading. Arguably, the Sixth Circuit’s reading would
have violated the Charming Betsy presumption.141 However, the Charming
Betsy presumption would not have been technically violated because the
Sixth Circuit’s reading only makes denaturalization mandatory for
immaterial misstatements, not deportation. Deportation is the only end-game
for denaturalized former citizens other than allowing them to remain in the
United States without citizenship rights and under a “deportable alien”
classification. Therefore, the Supreme Court may have anticipated in its
134

See id. (defining the plain meaning canon).
8 U.S.C.S. § 1451(e) (LexisNexis 2016).
136
18 U.S.C.S. §1425(a) (LexisNexis 2016).
137
Maslenjak v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1918, 1924–25 (2017).
138
See Eig, supra note 30, at 14–15 (defining the similar words or phrases canon).
139
See 8 U.S.C.S. § 1451(e) (LexisNexis 2016); 18 U.S.C.S. § 1425(a) (LexisNexis 2016).
140
United States v. Maslenjak, 821 F.3d 675, 683 (2016).
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See Canizares, supra note 115 (explaining the history and context of the Charming Betsy
presumption).
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decision that the Sixth Circuit’s reading runs too much of a risk of violating
Articles 32 and 33 of the 1951 Convention, which are later discussed in more
detail.
The rule of lenity also weighed in favor of the Ninth Circuit’s reading.142
Section 1425(a) is seemingly ambiguous because it does not specify whether
false statements must be material.143 If the statute is ambiguous, then the
criminal defendant should prevail in the dispute.144 Siding with criminal
defendants on this statutory scheme would have the practical result of
upholding the Ninth Circuit’s reading and overruling the Sixth Circuit.
Courts are typically deferential to prior decisions.145 This pattern of
deference is actually described by the court in Maslenjak when the court
discusses the progeny of the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Puerta.146 The Court
likely considered the potential to destabilize the immigration scheme and
cause serious issues for the United States domestically and abroad when
handing down its decision. The Court’s result was indeed consistent with the
weight of authority that follows the Ninth Circuit’s reading of the statutory
scheme.
Theoretically, a Supreme Court justice’s philosophy should weigh heavily
on a decision involving such precise interpretation of a statutory scheme.
This is seemingly evident with conservative justices like Gorsuch and Alito,
writing in concurrence with the majority opinion, where they demonstrate
their reliance on the text of the statute.147 It would be difficult to fit the
intentionalist school securely into either of the Circuits’ readings of the
statutory scheme.148 It seems the material requirement was intentionally left
out of § 1451(e), since the materiality requirement appears in one part of the
section but not another. However, the intentionalists could look at the
history of immigration and determine that the Founders would not have
advocated for such a reading given their desire for a robust immigration
system. An intentionalist justice could further determine that the legislature
made a mistake in omitting materiality. Justices subscribing to the pragmatic
school of statutory interpretation would be more likely to overturn the Sixth
Circuit’s decision.149 These justices would be willing to use the more
142

See Eig, supra note 30, at 30–31 (explaining the rule of lenity).
18 U.S.C.S. § 1425(a) (LexisNexis 2016).
144
Eig, supra note 30, at 30–31.
145
See id.
146
United States v. Maslenjak, 821 F.3d 675, 690–91 (2016).
147
Scott, supra note 118 (explaining the new textualist theory). See also Maslenjak v.
United States, 137 S. Ct. 1918, 1931–32 (2017) (Gorsuch, J., concurring); id. at 1932–33
(Alito, J., concurring).
148
See Scott, supra note 118 (explaining the intentionalist theory).
149
See id. at 406–08 (explaining the pragmatic theory).
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abstract substantive canons to reach the ideal reading of the statute. Here,
justices that might be expected to be pragmatists in fact used both sets of
canons, conceivably strengthening the majority’s decision to read in the
materiality requirement.150
III. POTENTIAL VIOLATIONS OF DOMESTIC POLICY AND INTERNATIONAL
OBLIGATIONS
A. Early Domestic Views on Immigration
Immigration and subsequent naturalization can be, and historically have
often been, beneficial both to the individual entering the United States and to
the United States itself. By denaturalizing citizens, the United States could
jeopardize those former citizens’ ability to work and live within the country.
Noncitizens who have lived in the United States for five years as lawful
permanent residents and can demonstrate good moral character, proficiency
in English, and knowledge of U.S. history are eligible for naturalization.151
The waiting period for noncitizens may be three years if they gained lawful
permanent resident status through marriage to a citizen.152 Immigrants who
become naturalized citizens receive new benefits such as security from
deportation, the right to vote, the ability to obtain public sector jobs, and the
ability to use a U.S. passport abroad.153 Citizens also tend to get priority
when they attempt to bring family members who are seeking permanent
resident status to the United States. In most circumstances, any children of
U.S. citizens that are born abroad will also be citizens of the United States.154
The efficacy and scope of immigration and naturalization has been
discussed since the founding of the country. First and foremost, the
Founding Fathers left the regulation of naturalization to Congress.155 The
Founding Fathers were quite liberal when it came to allowing immigrants
into the country. When the first Congress passed the Naturalization Act of

150

Maslenjak v. United States, 137 S. Ct. at 1930–31.
WILLIAM A. KANDEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43366, U.S. NATURALIZATION POLICY
(2014).
152
Naturalization for Spouses of U.S. Citizens, U.S. Citizenship and Immigr. Servs. (Jan. 22,
2013), https://www.uscis.gov/us-citizenship/citizenship-through-naturalization/naturalizationspouses-us-citizens.
153
Id.
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What Are the Benefits and Responsibilities of Citizenship?, U.S. Citizenship and Immigr.
Servs., https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/files/article/chapter2.pdf.
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U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
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1790, there were almost no restrictions on immigration.156 This open
immigration system flourished until at least 1880 because the United States
was primarily occupied with filling out the vast expanse of the growing
country and tapping its economic potential.157 After the Civil War, states
began passing their own immigration laws, and the Supreme Court
subsequently ruled that immigration was a federal responsibility.158 As the
number of immigrants rose due to a streamlined immigration process run
exclusively by the federal government, Congress began to pass statutes to
slow the rate of immigration.159
In contrast, the values of the Founding Fathers suggested they wanted an
immigration system that would allow foreign aliens to immigrate to the
United States, especially when facing persecution in their home countries.
To that end, President Washington said that he “had always hoped that this
land might become a safe and agreeable [a]sylum to the virtuous and
persecuted part of mankind, to whatever nation they might belong.”160
Thomas Jefferson echoed that sentiment in 1795.161 The Founding Fathers
also advocated for immigrants that would work hard and assimilate to
American society. They desired immigrants and naturalized citizens that
would be industrious and virtuous.162 As long as immigrants did not intend
to live a life of ease, the Founders welcomed them into the country.163 Ben
Franklin said:
[A]ll that seems to be necessary is, to distribute them more
equally, mix them with the English, establish English schools
where they are now too thick settled. . . . I say I am not against
the Admission of Germans in general, for they have their
Virtues, their industry and frugality are exemplary;

156

Kevin Portteus, Immigration and the American Founding (2012), https://www.hillsdale.
edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/FMF-2012-Immigration-and-the-American-Founding.pdf.
157
Schuck, supra note 88.
158
Early American Immigration Policies, U.S. Citizenship and Immigr. Servs. (Sept. 4,
2015), https://www.uscis.gov/history-and-genealogy/our-history/agency-history/early-americ
an-immigration-policies; see Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275 (1876) (holding California’s
statute excluding certain aliens from entering the state without paying a toll was
unconstitutional because it infringed upon the exclusive right of Congress to make laws on the
admission of foreign citizens).
159
Early American Immigration Policies, supra note 158.
160
Portteus, supra note 156.
161
See id. at 12 (describing a letter to Jean Nicolas Demeunier from Thomas Jefferson
indicating that he shared the same hopes as Washington).
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[t]hey . . . . contribute greatly to the improvement of the
Country.164
George Washington largely echoed the other Founding Fathers’
industrious sentiments when he said he wanted immigrants to come to
America “who are determined to be sober, industrious and virtuous members
of [s]ociety . . . a knowledge that these are the general characteristics of your
compatriots would be a principal reason to consider their advent as a
valuable acquisition to our infant settlements.”165
On assimilation,
Washington was representative of the Founders’ views as well in saying that
“[B]y an intermixture with our people, they, or their descendants, get
assimilated to our customs, measures, and laws: in a word, soon become one
people.”166 The requirement that all naturalized citizens swear an oath of
loyalty to the Constitution further indicates the Founders’ belief in
assimilation.167 The phrase E Pluribus Unum itself was a call to all citizens
to assimilate for the greater good of the country.168 Ultimately, the Founding
Fathers saw value in the naturalization of immigrants because immigrants
had the potential to benefit society through their work ethic, diversity, and
allegiance to the United States, which was an inherent requirement of
citizenship.169
B. Modern Domestic Goals of Immigration
Arguably, courts should care more about the modern domestic goals of
the immigration system than the views of the Founding Fathers on
immigration. However, most modern goals of the immigration system seem
to be consistent with what the Founding Fathers wanted from immigration.
As mentioned earlier, the modern goals of the immigration system are:
reuniting families, admitting workers with skillsets to fill labor shortages,
providing refuge for those that need shelter, and promoting diversity.170 True
assimilation seems to be less of a concern now than it was previously as the
164

Id.
Matthew Spalding, Why Does America Welcome Immigrants?, HERITAGE FOUND. (June 30,
2011), https://www.heritage.org/immigration/report/why-does-america-welcome-immigrants.
166
Portteus, supra note 156, at 18.
167
Id.
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Id. E Pluribus Unum (“out of many, one”) was adopted as the motto on the Great Seal of
the United States in 1782 after years of debate. The Great Seal of the United States, U.S.
DEP’T OF STATE BUREAU OF PUB. AFFAIRS 3–4 (2003), https://www.state.gov/documents/orga
nization/27807.pdf.
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Spalding, supra note 165, at 3, 5.
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nation and world become more globalized. Yet, some still remain concerned
about the slow integration of immigrants into their communities.171 The
United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), to that end,
provides money and programs in order to better integrate immigrants into
their communities.172 Of course, while the goals of immigration policy
remain similar, there are far more restrictions now on immigration policy
than there were in the late 1700s.
The most substantial restrictions in modern immigration policy are related
to concerns about national security and illegal immigration. National
security has been at the forefront of the immigration debate since the attacks
that took place on September 11, 2001. Resulting legislation like the
PATRIOT Act has made the immigration process more difficult. For
example, the PATRIOT Act broadened the definition of “terrorist” and put
the onus on the person being accused of terror to prove otherwise.173 The
PATRIOT Act may also allow the Attorney General to indefinitely detain
someone who is confined for a violation of conditions of entry into the
United States but cannot be deported to his or her country of origin.174 These
burdens on the immigration system may deter people from immigrating to
the United States, especially from the Middle East.175 Illegal immigration
has been at the forefront of political debates in the United States.176
However, it is not particularly relevant to the discussion in this Note, as
illegal immigrants are clearly not candidates for naturalization in the same
manner as the immigrants that come to the United States through the legal
channels of immigration.
Despite the restrictions on immigration policy due to national security
concerns, statistics demonstrate that the people becoming naturalized citizens
171
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today meet the goals of both the Founding Fathers and modern immigration
policy.
In fact, naturalization is often an indicator of successful
socioeconomic integration for foreign-born residents.177 For example, in the
1990 census, the rate of naturalization for foreign-born residents was higher
among more educated foreign-born residents.178 While only 43.5% of
foreign residents without a high school degree were naturalized, 65.1% of
immigrants with college degrees were naturalized.179 In a similar vein, the
higher the level of white collar occupation, the more likely a foreign-born
resident was to be naturalized.180 Also related to educational experience and
job prestige is income. Individual naturalized citizens made about $8,000
more per year than the average foreign-born noncitizen, and naturalized
households made about $6,000 more per year than noncitizen households.181
Those foreign-born residents below the poverty line naturalized at a 38%
rate, while 60% of those least likely to be poor were naturalized.182 Foreignborn residents that spoke English very well also naturalized at a rate of
59.4%, while those residents that spoke English poorly or did not speak
English at all are only naturalized at a rate of 27.4%.183 These statistics
demonstrate that the most productive and well-integrated immigrants are the
ones that could be potentially deported and denaturalized.
The Sixth Circuit’s reading of the interaction between § 1451(e) and
§ 1425(a) could have led to significant violations of domestic policy on
immigration. The Sixth Circuit’s decision would not have necessarily
impeded immigration on the front-end, but it could have impeded the number
of immigrants who seek to be naturalized. This could certainly put more
naturalized citizens at risk of denaturalization and possibly deportation.
Similarly, language in Justice Alito’s concurrence in the Supreme Court
Maslenjak decision suggests that the door could later be opened to
deportation in cases with less egregious false statements than that of Divna
Maslenjak.184 Immigrants who know or are worried that they may have
made immaterial false statements when entering the country may decline to
naturalize because they do not want to risk the false statements coming to
light, later leading to their denaturalization (if they decide to apply for
naturalization) and possible deportation. It is important not to incentivize
177
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lying so that immigrants can get into the country. The United States,
however, should be concerned of robbing immigrants who are content to
remain as lawful permanent residents or those on valid work visas, of the full
benefits of U.S. citizenship. Overall, the Sixth Circuit’s reading of the
statutory scheme to not require material false statements would likely have
been over-inclusive, because it would be likely to rid the country of good,
productive citizens. The same risks, to a lesser extent, could exist if Alito’s
concurrence gives rise to more denaturalized citizens.
Immigrants that do not have citizenship have less of a stake in society. It
seems more likely that those immigrants, especially if they are productive
and successful, could choose to move to another country if they have the
financial means. Additionally, President Washington’s hope for the United
States to be a haven for the virtuous but persecuted masses is unlikely to be
realized if immigrants refuse to naturalize or leave the country due to
concerns related to false statements that could lead to denaturalization and
deportation.185 These potential results from the Sixth Circuit’s decision in
Maslenjak essentially amounted to a violation of the domestic immigration
policy because it would have reduced the number of good potential citizens
that will enter the country and likely could have affected how many choose
to remain or naturalize. Similarly, a less harsh but still problematic reality
could be true if future courts seize on Alito’s concurrence.
Open immigration, like the Founders advocated for, is unrealistic for the
United States today. For example, it has been documented how groups like
ISIS have snuck terrorists into countries by disguising them as refugees.186
Regardless, once immigrants are admitted to the United States, work hard,
and want to become citizens, it does not behoove the United States to
denaturalize those immigrants for minor false statements used to procure
naturalization. This is particularly true when there is a plausible way to
construe the statutory scheme that would only make serious false statements
criminal under 8 U.S.C. § 1451(e).
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Domestic immigration policy has long sought to incentivize productive
immigrants to remain and integrate into society.187 By mandatorily
denaturalizing citizens, the United States would be emphasizing the opposite.
In fact, Ratko Maslenjak was demonstrably a productive immigrant. In
2014, he was given an award in Ohio for his job as a “ ‘hand finisher’ who
carefully inspects and smooths out finished metal molds used by major
rubber companies.”188 Again, the Maslenjaks are not an exemplar for the
argument that immaterial false statements should not trigger mandatory
denaturalization, since their false statements used to procure Divna
Maslenjak’s naturalization were probably material. Still, immigrants like the
Maslenjaks that have been productive, valued members of their communities
during their residency in the United States likely satisfy the Founding
Fathers’ goals of assimilation into American society.189 Therefore, the Sixth
Circuit’s reading would not only have adverse effects on the productiveness
of immigrants, but could also lead to the deportation of those that are doing a
good job of integrating into society. In Ratko Maslenjak’s case, a productive
immigrant (though he had not chosen to naturalize and become a citizen)
who had not committed war crimes and was nothing but a model resident in
the United States was deported for a single transgression. This case
demonstrates the point that denaturalization and deportation are unduly harsh
punishments for minor false statements used to procure naturalization.190
Although the facts of the Maslenjak case is not great evidence that the
Sixth Circuit’s reading would have been detrimental to refugees seeking
entry into and eventually citizenship in the United States, it is easy to
imagine other cases where the Sixth Circuit’s ruling could have significantly
affected naturalized citizens. The Bosnian Civil War was quite short
compared to some of the serious ongoing conflicts presently displacing
people. Currently, over 65 million people are estimated to be refugees or
other forcibly-displaced persons.191 In Iraq, a country that has been in nearconstant turmoil for several decades, nearly 5 million people were dubbed
“of concern” by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
187
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(UNHCR) as either refugees, asylum-seekers, or internally-displaced persons
in recent years.192 In Colombia, the state has been in conflict with the rebel
group FARC since 1964.193 The most extraordinary current case is in Syria,
where the terrorist group ISIS displaced almost 7 million Syrians by the end
of 2016.194 All of this is to say that it is possible that refugees in the future,
considering the Alito concurrence in the Supreme Court’s decision, could
maintain their refugee status even if they are denaturalized and lose their
U.S. citizenship. If that does indeed happen, the United States is stuck in a
situation where it has taken the refugees’ benefits of citizenship but subjected
them to a second-class life labeled as “deportable aliens.”
C. International Obligations of the United States
Deportation of persons like the Maslenjaks could also potentially
jeopardize the United States’ international law obligations. States that are
parties to the treaties are bound internationally (even if not domestically) to
not take any action to defeat the object and purpose of the treaty.195 The
United States is not a party to the 1951 Convention, but it is a party to the
1967 Protocol, which incorporates the first thirty-four articles of the 1951
Convention.196 The United States ratified the 1967 Protocol in 1968.197 The
ratification process makes the treaty part of the domestic law of the United
States.198 The 1951 Convention was written, signed, and ratified in the
aftermath of World War II, at which point various international states wanted
to address the issue of the various refugees and other persons that had been
displaced by the War.199 The parties to the 1951 Convention decided to set a
temporal limit and allowed states to opt-in to a provision that would limit
coverage only to events occurring in Europe for refugees that would be
192
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protected under the treaty.200 The parties to the treaty were primarily
concerned about future influxes of refugees that could warrant protection
under the terms of the treaty.201 Although the treaty was supposed to
complement the UNHCR, the UNHCR’s mandate did not restrict the
definition of protected refugees by time or geography.202 The 1967 Protocol
was introduced in large part to eliminate the temporal limit on the definition
of refugee in the original 1951 Convention.203
The 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol are still central to the
international community’s efforts to protect refugees.204 Article 1 of the
1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol defines refugees as
any person who is outside their country of origin and unable or
unwilling to return there or to avail themselves of its
protection, on account of a well-founded fear of persecution for
reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a
particular group, or political opinion. Stateless persons may
also be refugees in this sense, where country of origin
(citizenship) is understood as “country of former habitual
residence.”205
The 1951 Convention also sets the parameters for when refugee status ends.
Refugee status lasts until and unless the refugee returns to their country of
origin, acquires a new nationality, or circumstances change in their country
of origin.206
Beyond the provided definition of refugee, the 1951 Convention and 1967
Protocol laid out several principles that are still important to the treatment of
refugees by the global community. Foremost among them, the UNHCR calls
the principle of non-refoulement “the cornerstone of asylum and of
international refugee law.”207 Non-refoulement is the broad principle that no
refugee should be returned to a country where he would be at risk of
persecution.208 The principle of non-refoulement was originally espoused in
the non-binding Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 but was not
200
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a binding principle on any state until the 1951 Convention.209 The 1984
Convention Against Torture expanded the coverage of non-refoulement to
prevent deportation of individuals to countries where the individual would be
at substantial risk to be tortured.210 As previously stated, the principle of
non-refoulement binds more than just the parties to the 1951 Convention and
1967 Protocol. In fact, it is also considered customary international law by
the UNHCR. This means every state, regardless of whether it is a party to
either convention, is bound to follow it.211 Some scholars even argue that
non-refoulement is becoming non-derogable as jus cogens.212 In addition to
protecting refugees and displaced persons from non-refoulement, the 1951
Convention also protects refugees from penalties for illegal entry and
prevents most expulsions.213
In the United States, Senator Patrick Leahy of Vermont has attempted
several times to update the United States’ domestic commitment to
protecting refugees who are fleeing torture or persecution, but five bills of
similar substance have died in the Senate since 1999.214 Senator Leahy has
recently submitted another bill to the current Congress, which never reached
a vote.215 That result is likely due to the current political climate.216 In
general, reform on the treatment of refugees and asylum seekers has been
tough for nations like the United States since the attacks on September 11,
2001.217 Since September 11, 2001, the United States has prioritized antiterrorism measures over refugee protection measures.218 In doing so, the
United States has relied on language in Article 33(2) of the 1951
Convention.219 According to one scholar, this trend of sacrificing refugee
209
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protections for anti-terrorism measures “could have a catastrophic effect,
excluding legitimate refugees from protection, weakening the foundations of
the refugee law regime, and undermining the legitimacy of the new
peremptory norm.”220 Presumably, these anti-terrorism statutes enacted and
justified under a broad reading of Article 33(2) of the 1951 Convention could
lead to the United States violating their international law obligations in some
instances.221
If denaturalized former citizens maintain their refugee status, then the
United States is at risk of violating both Articles 32 and 33 of the 1951
Convention.222 The UNHCR holds the position that refugees expelled under
Articles 32 or 33 do not necessarily lose refugee status.223 Therefore, the
United States would not be able to deport denaturalized citizens maintaining
refugee status as non-citizens without violating international law. The
United States would violate either their obligations under the 1967 Protocol
or potentially the principles of non-refoulement as customary international
law, assuming that the persons could establish they maintained refugee
status.224 Thus, while the refugees could be denaturalized under domestic
law and lose the benefits of citizenship, they could not be deported from the
United States to their country of origin without violating international law.
This possibility leaves the United States in a position of choosing between
potentially violating Articles 32 and 33 of the 1951 Convention or allowing
the denaturalized former-citizens to stay in the country without the rights of
citizenship they previously would have maintained. These citizens would
seemingly be second-class or shadow-class citizens.
The United States, if it expels former citizens who maintain their refugee
status but were denaturalized for minor false statements used to procure
naturalization, would be at risk of violating Article 32 of the 1951
Convention. Refugees are guaranteed due process. Under Article 32,
refugees may only be expelled on grounds of “national security or public
order.”225 The United States would risk violating the principles of nonrefoulement as well. The United States could violate their obligations to not
return refugees to areas where their life or liberty is at risk under Article 34
220
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of the 1951 Convention. Under Article 34, refugees are protected unless
they are convicted of a “particularly serious crime” that constitutes a danger
to the security of the country that the refugee is in at the time. Further
strengthening the United States’ obligations to the principle of nonrefoulement is that the UNHCR sees the right to non-refoulement as nonderogable customary international law, meaning states can never waive the
right of non-refoulement under any circumstance.
The UNHCR has commented that expulsion should be a last resort for
“exceptional circumstances,” and suggests that refugees should be treated
leniently because they have been uprooted and have no home country to
which they can return.226 Looking to the Maslenjaks, for example, it is hard
to imagine how they might be a threat to national security or public order.
The pair, regardless of their transgressions, seemed to be well-adjusted to
their community. And the Maslenjaks, as previously noted, would not
necessarily still be considered refugees because of the now-stable political
situation in Bosnia. In a situation where persons still qualify for refugee
status after denaturalization, the United States could not expel them from the
country without risking violation of Article 32 unless the refugees had
committed more criminal acts that demonstrated a propensity to be a threat to
national security or public order.
The fair rebuttal to this argument is that just because more citizens could
be denaturalized, it does not necessarily follow that denaturalized former
citizens will be deported and put the United States at risk of violating its
obligations under the 1951 Convention. However, this argument ignores the
realities of former citizens that have been denaturalized. For one, they
instantly become aliens that are subject for removal. The United States,
according to the Supreme Court, cannot keep these aliens incarcerated for
more than six months while waiting for another country to accept them for
deportation purposes.227 Therefore, these former citizens are left with
uncertainty about their status and would likely question whether or not they
should continue their lives in the United States, given they can be removed at
any time.
In fact, the anecdotal stories about people that have been denaturalized
but remain in the United States paint a grim picture of what life is like as a
denaturalized former citizen living within the country. Nada Prouty came to
the United States from Lebanon and served as a CIA agent for several
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years.228 She was convicted of contriving a sham marriage in order to obtain
citizenship and was denaturalized as a result.229 She was not deported to
Lebanon due to non-refoulement problems, and thus remains in the United
States.230 However, she is unable to get a job, open a bank account, or travel
beyond fifty miles from her home as someone who maintains “deportable
alien” status and remains under surveillance by immigration officials.231
Lionel Jean-Baptiste arrived in the United States from Haiti and was
naturalized. Later, a drug conviction led to his denaturalization because the
government said that it evidenced that he did not have “good moral
character” during the application process for citizenship.232 Jean-Baptiste’s
potential deportation did not have non-refoulement concerns, but everywhere
the United States attempted to deport him refused to take him.233 Haiti
rejected him because he had renounced his Haitian citizenship, and attempts
to deport him to France and the Dominican Republic were also
unsuccessful.234 Jean-Baptiste was released to his family, but may not have
been able to work or drive.235 Further, like Prouty, he would remain under
watch by immigration officials.236
Instances like these two will increase if naturalized citizens are subject to
denaturalization for insignificant false statements used to procure
naturalization. If the U.S. government does deport former citizens, it risks
violating obligations under international law. If the United States does not
deport denaturalized citizens, it leaves them in an uncertain holding pattern
as a second-class or shadow-class citizen where they have few basic
privileges and rights that someone residing in a country might expect but
cannot return to their country of origin. These former citizens may be able to
work if they can secure asylum status from within the United States.237 It is
unclear why that was not possible for either of the citizens in the anecdotes
above. What is indisputable, though, is that their rights within the United
States were drastically restricted for what amounted to minor transgressions.
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This dilemma between making people second or shadow-class citizens or
deporting them is just one example of the dangers of a reading of the
statutory scheme that weakens the burden on the government to denaturalize
citizens.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Sixth Circuit decision placed the enforcement of the statutory scheme
in 18 U.S.C. § 1425(a) and 8 U.S.C. § 1451(e) in an untenable position. The
statutory canons of construction illuminate the arguments that would be
made in favor of and against the Sixth Circuit’s reading, but the Supreme
Court employed both textual and substantive canons to rule against the Sixth
Circuit. The justices may have overturned the Sixth Circuit’s ruling based on
policy concerns. From a domestic viewpoint, the Ninth Circuit’s reading is
far preferable because it will allow the United States to keep more
productive, naturalized citizens in the country. From an international
perspective, the United States will not risk violating international obligations
under the 1967 Protocol that would result from mandatorily denaturalizing
citizens for immaterial false statements and deporting them.
The Sixth Circuit’s reading of the statutory scheme also would have
violated the domestic goal of promoting immigration of productive persons
into the United States. Further, if the United States were to deport
denaturalized former citizens, it would risk violating Articles 32 and 33 of
the 1951 Refugee Convention. The United States is obligated to follow the
1951 Convention through the 1967 Protocol to the Refugee Convention.
Further, the United States’ obligations to the principle of non-refoulement
are even stronger because they are considered jus cogens and thus nonderogable by the UNHCR. If the United States denaturalized former citizens
but did not deport them to avoid repercussions in international law, then it
would subject these former citizens to a second-class lifestyle where they
could not travel, work, or drive, and could not leave the United States for
another country. This would be a patently unfair result for someone who
gave immaterial false statements in order to procure naturalization for
themselves or for someone else. For now, the Supreme Court has resolved
these issues, but the fissures could easily open again due to the opinions
concurring in the judgment that cast doubt on Justice Kagan’s majority
opinion. The best solution, despite the fact that the Court found there is a
materiality requirement for false statements made to government officials to
trigger mandatory criminal denaturalization, would be a statutory amendment
that would add the materiality requirement to the text and render this entire
debate moot.

